Using survey data collected from senior corporate executives around the world I analyze how detection of bribery impacts firm competitiveness. The data suggest that the most significant impact is on employee morale, followed by business relations and reputation, and then regulatory relations. I find that who initiated the bribery act, how it was detected, and how the firm responded after detection are all associated with the impact on a firm's reputation, business relations, regulatory relations, and employee morale. Internally initiated bribery from senior management is more likely to be associated with a significant impact on firm competitiveness. Bribery detected by the control systems of the firm is less likely to be associated with a significant impact on both business and regulatory relations. Finally, bribery cases where the initiator of the bribery is dismissed are less likely to be associated with a significant impact of firm competitiveness. These results shed light on which organizations' competitiveness is more likely to be affected by the detection of bribery.
3 corruption in the company's operations. 2 Alstom responded stating that such, unfair according to company executives, moves by large institutional investors were affecting the reputation of the firm and its future competitiveness. As a result, both regulatory and market forces are likely to affect the competitiveness of the company.
Several studies attempt to draw conclusions from stock market reactions about the impact of bribery detection on firm competitiveness with conflicting results. Smith, Stettler, and Beedles (1984) examine share price reactions to announcements by 98 firms that voluntarily reported payments to foreign government officials during the SEC's pre-FCPA amnesty program that ended in 1978. The average stock price reaction is negative leading the authors to conclude that this reflects investors' expectations of future government sanctions or the loss of future business. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2012) examine the stock market response to firms prosecuted for foreign bribery and find that their stock price declines by 3.11%, on average, on the first day that news of the bribery enforcement action is reported, and by 8.98%
over all announcements related to the enforcement action. However, they find that most bribery enforcement actions are co-mingled with charges of financial misrepresentation and fraud, and that most of these firms' costs are due to the financial violations, not the bribery charges per se.
The confounding of bribery with other violations of the law is one problem for studies that attempt to draw inferences from stock price reactions. Another it is the fact that it is not clear that investors are able to understand how the firm's long-run competitiveness and specifically its business relations, reputation, regulatory relations and employee morale are affected by the bribery incident.
Corporate executives are much more likely to be able to understand those effects and provide an assessment. In addition, the regulatory and social context within which bribery happens is radically different now. Enforcement against bribery cases was barely existent before 2007, but it is now much more frequent in some jurisdictions (Healy and Serafeim, 2013) . Moreover, efforts in the last ten years by numerous civil society and private organizations, along with government initiatives to promote 2 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/06/norway-fund-idUSL5E7N62LI20111206 4 responsible business practices under the umbrella of 'corporate sustainability' are changing the business landscape. Specifically, companies that operate responsibly are more likely to enjoy advantages in product, labor and capital markets (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2013) . Therefore, inferences drawn from bribery cases that were detected even ten years ago is unlikely to be applicable to the current business environment.
To overcome these challenges I use proprietary survey data, from 2009 and 2011, provided by PwC that surveyed its clients on bribery incidences. Executives identified their companies as having experienced a bribery incident over the last year, as well as who was the initiator of the bribery incident, how it was detected, and how the firm responded. Moreover, executives evaluated the significance of the impact of the bribery incident and discovery on the firm's competitiveness. I use data on all companies that were identified as having experienced a bribery incident to analyze the association between the characteristics of the initiator, the method of detection, and the firm's response with the perceived significance of the impact on the competitiveness of the company.
I find evidence that the perceived impact of bribery detection on the competitiveness of the company, is more likely to be significant when the initiator is internal (i.e. employee) rather than external (i.e. customer, supplier, agent) to the firm. Executives believe that the impact on the firm's reputation, business relations, and employee morale is more severe when the initiator is internal. Moreover, the impact is more likely to be significant if the internal initiator is part of the senior management. This is the case for the impact on reputation, regulatory relations, and employee morale.
In addition, I find evidence that the method of detection is significantly associated with the perceived significance of the impact on competitiveness. Both business and regulatory relations are less likely to be affected if bribery was detected by the formal (i.e., anticorruption and security systems) or informal (i.e., tip-offs and whistle-blowers) internal control systems of the company. This result suggests that executives are most worried about the impact on firm competitiveness when bribery is detected by regulators or the media.
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A firm's response to the discovery of bribery is also significantly associated with the impact on competitiveness. Consistently, executives of firms that dismiss internal initiators or cease relations with external initiators perceive the impact on competitiveness to be lower. Specifically, when the initiator is internal and the person is dismissed, the impact on reputation, business and regulatory relations is less likely to be significant. Similarly, if the initiator is external and the person is dismissed, the impact on reputation and employee morale is less likely to be significant. This provides strong evidence that executives believe that dismissal of internal or external initiators can be an effective mechanism to restrict the damage on a firm's competitiveness.
Across all specifications, I include controls for firm size, ownership status, the magnitude of the direct financial impact from bribery, organizational position of the survey responder, geographic location, and industry membership. I find some interesting associations among the control variables and the perceived impact on competitiveness. Executives of larger firms perceive the impact on reputation, business relations and employee morale to be less likely to be significant. In contrast, executives of government-controlled companies are more likely to perceive the impact on reputation and regulatory relations to be significant.
Given the primitive stage of research in this area, it is hard to draw any conclusions about causality from these relations. Thereby, I cast all hypotheses as associations between the different variables. However, I include several control variables that might be operating as correlated omitted variables otherwise. Moreover, I conduct a host of additional analyses to gain further insight on what drives these associations. Specifically, I test how these relations are moderated by the level of corruption in a firm's country, the organizational position of the survey respondent, whether the respondent disclosed the name of the company in the survey, and the direct financial impact from bribery.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample and the data. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 6
Hypotheses Development
I examine three characteristics that might be related to the impact on company competitiveness from detection of bribery. Specifically, I consider who the initiator of bribery was, how the bribe was detected, and how the firm responded after the detection of bribery.
Initiator
Bribery can be initiated either by a person internal (i.e., employees) or external (i.e., agents, suppliers, customers) to the organization. Internally initiated bribery might have a larger impact on the competitiveness of the company for multiple reasons. First, it signals that the culture and control systems inside the organization, which are there to prevent bribery, have failed. Therefore, detection of internally initiated bribery is more likely to impact the reputation of the organization by exposing the ineffectiveness of internal control systems and signaling that the culture of a firm is tolerant of such behavior. Similarly, it is more likely to impact business relations with customers and suppliers, which avoid doing business with organizations that do not show a commitment and adequate control systems to avoid corruption. Moreover, internally initiated bribery is more likely to impact employee morale since a fellow employee, rather than an outside party, was involved in illegal activity.
Within the group of internally initiated bribery, I expect a larger impact when the initiator was part of the senior management. In those cases, the signal that there might be something wrong with the culture of the company is even stronger since the activity was initiated by a person that is a leader of the organization. This is especially true for employee morale. Employees are more likely to look to senior leadership to set the standards for individual conduct. When their expectations are not met, employees are likely to feel disappointed, confused, and ultimately demotivated.
Within the group of externally initiated bribery, I expect a larger impact when the initiator was an agent of the firm rather than a government employee, customer, or supplier. In cases where the initiator was an agent, one could argue that the agent was acting on behalf of the firm thereby resembling more of an internally initiated bribery act. In a survey of business development directors of 50 US and 50
European companies, an overwhelming majority of those surveyed stated that companies used middlemen 7 such as agents, joint venture partners or foreign subsidiaries to avoid direct involvement with corruption either 'regularly' or 'occasionally ' (Control Risks Group, 1998) . There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence which blames intermediary agents, hired by corporations, for increasing corruption in the developing world (Wiehen 1999) . The first hypothesis is:
H1: The impact on company competitiveness is related to who initiated the bribery act.
Detection Method
There are three broad categories under which methods to detect bribery can be classified. The first is formal control systems employed by the firm. These include anticorruption systems, internal and external auditing procedures, and risk management systems. The second is informal control systems that are descriptive of a firm's culture. These include tips provided by people internal or external to the organization and information coming from whistle-blowing systems. The third is methods outside management's control. These include investigations by regulatory and law enforcement authorities, reports by competitors, and media investigations.
I expect that the impact on firm competitiveness will be smaller when bribery is detected by a firm's control systems. In these cases, the firm shows that it is capable of controlling illegal behavior from the part of its employees or business partners. This can send a strong signal both to business partners and regulators that the firm is committed to fighting corruption and that it has the proper systems to do so, thereby mitigating any effect on business and regulatory relations. Detection method is less likely to impact employee morale, since employees are unlikely to pay attention to how bribery was detected. The second hypothesis is:
The impact on company competitiveness is related to how the bribery act was detected.
Firm Response
There are three broad responses that a firm can adopt after the discovery of a bribery act. One is to pursue legal action, in particular civil action, against the initiator. Second, it can proactively inform regulatory authorities about the incident. Third, it can proceed to dismiss the employee or cease relations with the business partner who initiated the bribery act. Of course a company can choose to do nothing.
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The relation between choosing to pursue legal action and firm competitiveness is unclear. On the one hand, pursuing legal action might be a signal that the bribery act is likely to have serious consequences on a firm. Similarly, a legal battle can generate negative publicity damaging a firm's reputation and serving as a deterrent for customers and suppliers from doing business with the company.
On the other hand, it can serve as a signal that the company is the victim, mitigating any negative effect on business relations and reputation. Similarly, ambiguous is the relation between informing regulatory authorities and impact on firm competitiveness. Cases where regulators are informed are more likely to be very serious cases of bribery and as a result they are more likely to have a significant effect on firm competiveness. On the other hand, especially with respect to regulatory relations, it could be perceived as an act of good faith where the company is willing to cooperate with the regulators. The relation between dismissal and cease of relation with the initiator and firm competitiveness is more straightforward.
Dismissing the initiator is a strong signal that the firm has zero tolerance against corruption. This could mitigate any negative effects on firm competitiveness.
H3: The impact on company competitiveness is related to how the company responded after discovery of the bribery act.

Sample and Data
The sample comprises a set of companies around the world that are clients of the forensic services practice of PwC. PwC got responses from approximately 3,000 and 4,000 clients in 2009 and 2011
respectively. 3 Approximately ten percent of the respondents to each survey identified that their firm was involved in a bribery scheme. In total, the number of observations is 509, but the actual number of observations slightly varies across tests because of missing data for some of the variables. The tests include only those firms that responded affirmatively to the existence of bribery in their organizations.
The responder was able to answer anonymously and as a result responders had little incentive not to report truthfully. Moreover, restricting the sample to respondents that admitted bribery avoids problems of not reporting the existence of bribery. That being said the sample is not random, limiting the potential generalizability of the results. The sample comprises firms that are clients of a Big 4 audit firm, responded to the survey, detected the bribery incident, and collected information about the perpetrator, detection method, and response to the incident. The results might not be generalizable to companies that are not clients of Big 4 audit firms, or that are but would not respond to the survey or would not anonymously admit to have been involved in a bribery incident, or were not capable of detecting the bribery incident. The sample is broader compared to other studies because it is not limited to firms that were caught paying bribes and firms that received publicity or regulatory sanctions (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2012) . Table 1 shows frequency distribution of sample firms across countries. Not surprisingly, a large part of the sample comes from emerging market countries where bribery is a relatively frequent phenomenon. The sample includes many firms from South Africa, Russia, Ukraine, and Mexico.
However, there is a fair amount of companies coming from developed markets where corruption is much less frequent, such as Australia, the UK, and the US. In untabulated statistics, companies in financial services, manufacturing, retail, energy, utilities, mining, and construction sectors comprise most of the observations. Table 2 shows summary statistics for all variables. Executives could state whether they believed that the detection of bribery would have a "Significant," "Not Significant or Insignificant," or "Not
Significant" effect on firm competitiveness. 27 and 46 percent of the executives believe that the bribery incident will have a significant and insignificant effect on firm reputation. In contrast, 47 and 25 percent thinks that it will have a significant and insignificant impact on employee morale. More executives believe that bribery will have an effect on business (36 percent significant and 33 percent insignificant) rather than regulatory relations (26 percent significant and 46 percent insignificant). These results suggest that there is a fair amount of variation in whether executives think bribery will affect their firms' 10 competitiveness. Moreover, according to executives the most significant impact is on employee morale, followed by business relations and reputation, and then on regulatory relations.
In terms of bribery magnitude, 35 percent of the bribery incidents involve small direct financial impact of less than $100,000. 50 percent of the cases involve moderate direct financial impact between $100,000 and $500,000. Only 16 percent of the cases involve amounts more than $500,000.
66 (34) percent of the bribery was initiated internally (externally). In 26 percent of the cases the initiator was a senior executive of the company. 25 percent of the external initiators were agents/intermediaries hired by the company. Among the cases of internal initiation, in 46 percent of the cases civil action was taken, while regulatory authorities were notified in 39 percent of the cases. 81 percent of the initiators were dismissed. Among the cases of external initiation, in 54 percent of the cases civil action was taken, while regulatory authorities were notified in 57 percent of the cases. In 51 percent of the cases business relations with the initiator were ceased. It seems that companies are more likely to inform regulators in cases where bribery was initiated by a person external to the organization. At the same time, companies are less likely to cease business relations with an external initiator of bribery.
38 percent of the cases were revealed by internal control systems, 36 percent by internal and external tips and whistle-blowers, and 26 percent by factors outside management's control (regulators, media etc.). Internally initiated bribery is slightly less likely to be detected by formal internal control systems and slightly more likely to be detected by the control systems that characterize the culture of a firm. This might reflect that employees of the firm might be able to circumvent formal control systems more easily because they have a better understanding of these systems. However, their actions might be more likely to be detected by other employees who then tip-off management.
There is a fair amount of variation in firm size. 32 percent of the sample is large firms that have more than 5,000 employees. 25 percent of the sample has between 1,000 and 5,000 employees, 25 percent 
Results
To test the hypotheses of section 2, I estimate ordered logistic regressions. This functional form is appropriate given the discrete ordinal nature of the dependent variable. For each dependent variable of interest, I estimate a pooled regression with bribery cases that have been initiated either internally or externally, and separate regressions for internally or externally initiated cases. The separate models allows for identification of the relation between the impact on firm competitiveness and characteristics of the initiator or firm response after detection of bribery that differs across the two samples. Table 3 shows the results of the estimation with the impact on a firm's reputation as dependent variable. The table shows that detection of bribery is 36.6 percent more likely to have a significant impact on a firm's reputation if it was initiated by an employee of the firm. Moreover, the more senior this employee is the more likely the impact will be significant. The likelihood of significant impact increases by 64.9 percent if the employee is part of senior management. The method of detection is not significantly associated with impact on reputation. The same is not the case for how a firm responded to the discovery of bribery. Dismissal of an employee that initiated bribery or cease of business relations with an outside party that initiated bribery is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on a firm's reputation. Dismissing an employee reduces the probability of significant impact by 65.7 percent.
Among the control variables, only the direct financial impact from bribery is consistently associated with the dependent variable. This is not too surprising, given that bribery of larger magnitude should be associated with a higher likelihood of significant impact on a firm's reputation. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation with the impact on a firm's business relations as dependent variable. The table shows that detection of bribery is more likely to have a significant impact on a firm's reputation if it was initiated by an employee of the firm. In contrast to the previous results on reputation, I do not find that the more senior this employee is the more likely the impact will be significant. Moreover, the method of detection is significantly associated with the impact on business relations. Bribery cases that were detected by the internal control systems of the firm are 29.8 percent less 12 likely to be associated with a significant impact. Dismissal of an employee that initiated bribery is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on a firm's reputation. Among the control variables, in addition to the direct financial impact from bribery, I find that firm size is significantly associated with the dependent variable. Executives of smaller firms perceive the impact on business relations to be more likely to be significant. This might reflect the lower bargaining power that small firms have and the associated lower dependence, of both customers and suppliers, on them. by an employee of the firm. Consistent with the previous results on reputation, I do find that the more senior this employee is the more likely the impact will be significant. Moreover, the method of detection is significantly associated with the impact on regulatory relations. Bribery cases that were detected by the internal control systems or through tip-offs and whistle blowers are 34.1 percent and 25.3 percent, respectively, less likely to be associated with a significant impact. Dismissal of an employee that initiated bribery or cease of business relations with an outside party that initiated bribery is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on a firm's reputation. Interestingly, I do not find informing regulatory authorities to be negatively associated with a lower likelihood of a significant impact on regulatory relations. In contrast, for internally initiated cases, the coefficient is positive and significant. Table 6 shows the results of the estimation with the impact on employee morale as dependent variable. The table shows that detection of bribery is 68.3 percent more likely to have a significant impact on employee morale if it was initiated by an employee of the firm. Moreover, the more senior this employee is the more likely the impact will be significant. The probability of significant impact increases by 84.8 percent if the employee is part of senior management. The method of detection or how a firm responded to the discovery of bribery is not significantly associated with impact on reputation. Among the control variables, in addition to the direct financial impact from bribery, I find that firm size is significantly associated with the dependent variable. Executives of smaller firms perceive the impact on 13 employee morale to be more likely to be significant. In smaller organizations where all employees know each other and are likely to interact with each other on the job or even socially, the effect of discovery of bribery is more likely to demotivate employees.
Overall, the evidences strongly support hypothesis 1 that who initiates is significantly associated with the impact on firm competitiveness. Internally initiated bribery from senior executives is correlated with higher likelihood of significant impact. Bribery cases detected by the internal control systems of the firm seem to be associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on the business and regulatory relations of a firm. Finally, firms that responded by firing an employee or ceasing business relations with outside parties that initiated the bribery have lower likelihood of significant impact.
Additional Analyses
High vs. Low Corruption Countries
While bribery is a widespread phenomenon, frequency of bribery differs widely across geographies. In some countries, bribing is the norm, while in other countries it is a much rarer phenomenon. It could be that in countries where bribing is rampant, the discovery of a bribery scheme could have little effect on firm competitiveness. Moreover, enforcement against bribery varies markedly around the world affecting investments in anticorruption control systems and potentially the way firms respond to the discovery of bribery. Therefore, the country in which a country primarily operates might affect how the characteristics of the initiator, the detection method, and the firm's response to the discovery of bribery are related to the impact on firm competitiveness.
To better understand how home country corruption moderates the relation between the variables of interest, I separate the sample to low and high corruption countries based on the corruption perception index of Transparency International. 4 I classify firms ranking above the median in the index as low corruption countries and vice versa. The results (untabulated) suggest that there are no differences across high and low corruption countries, when it comes to impact on regulatory relations and employee morale. While the result on employee morale might be expected since disapproval of bribery is strong in every country, the result on regulatory relations is more surprising. One could expect that in countries with higher corruption the impact on regulatory relations would differ since in those countries the government can be part of the corruption problem. In high corruption countries, bribery that is initiated by a person internal to the organization is more strongly related to the impact on both reputation and business relations. The same is the case when bribery is initiated externally to the organization and the initiator is an agent of the company. Overall, who initiates bribery seems to be even more related to the impact on reputation and business relations in high corruption countries. Specifically, internally initiated bribery seems to be the most costly, followed by bribery initiated by an agent of the firm, and then bribery initiated by other external actors.
C-suite vs. Non C-suite Responder
While all responses to the survey are provided by senior executives, there is still variation across To understand how the associations differ across the two groups I estimate separate specifications. The results (untabulated) suggest that for C-level executives internally initiated bribery is more strongly related to impact on firm reputation and employee morale. Moreover, for C-level executives, bribery detected by internal control systems is more negatively related with the significance of 15 an impact on business relations. None of the other documented relations differs across the two groups.
Overall, it seems that the documented results vary little with the seniority of the responder.
Large vs. Small Financial Impact
As I documented before most of the bribery cases fall in the small or moderate size category. One of the strongest results in the estimated models is that bribery cases of larger amount are associated with higher likelihood of significant impact on firm competitiveness. However, we still have a limited understanding of whether the documented associations between the independent variables of interest and the impact on firm competitiveness will vary with the size of the bribery incident. A plausible hypothesis is that for small sizes of bribery, who initiated the bribery, the method of detection and how the firm responded might not be associated with impact on firm competitiveness since for small size bribes the impact is not expected to be large. In contrast, one could argue that independent of the size of bribery the results would not differ since bribery is illegal and morally wrong independent of its size.
I estimate separate models for small, moderate and large bribery cases and find that across all specifications the results are remarkably similar. None of the estimated coefficients are significantly different across the samples. Therefore, the estimated relations do not vary with the size of the bribery.
Disclosed Company Name vs. Not
39 percent of the respondents disclosed the company's name to PwC when responding to the survey, while 61 percent did not. 5 Different firms have different incentives to withhold information even when interacting with the forensic services of a Big 4 audit firm that serves them as a client. Non-disclosure of company name might be a signal of reluctance to share information because of ongoing investigations, future increases in legal liabilities and/or limited understanding of the bribery incident. These circumstances might affect an executive's responses to the survey in an unpredictable way. In contrast, disclosure of company name might be a signal of confidence in the understanding of the situation.
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To examine how the relations documented here vary across the two samples we estimate separate relations. I fail to find any significant differences across the two samples, except in the case of informing regulators after detection of bribery. The sample that disclosed the company name exhibited a stronger negative correlation between informing regulatory authorities and likelihood of significant impact on firm competitiveness. One explanation of this result is that firms that are willing to share the company name with their forensic advisors believe in transparency and in the proactive engagement with regulators to avoid damage on firm competitiveness.
Conclusion
I examine how the impact on firm competitiveness from the detection of bribery varies with the identity of the initiator, the method bribery was detected, and the firm's response after detection. I find that all three dimensions are significantly associated with the impact on firm competitiveness. Internally initiated bribery from senior executives is correlated with higher likelihood of significant impact. Bribery cases detected by the internal control systems of the firm are associated with a lower likelihood of significant impact on the business and regulatory relations of a firm. Finally, firms that responded by firing an employee or ceasing business relations with outside parties that initiated the bribery have lower likelihood of significant impact.
The dependent variable comprises corporate executives' perceptions of the impact on firm competitiveness rather than the actual impact on competitiveness. To the extent that the two constructs are significantly different and perceptions are different from reality in this setting, the results should be interpreted with caution. If perceptions are not an accurate indication of reality then future research is needed to examine whether the relations documented here hold when one uses actual data on firm competitiveness. However, in this paper, I am interested in understanding how perceptions of impact vary with these characteristics. Perceptions are important because they affect managerial behavior. Managers make investment, financing and operating decisions based on how they perceive the environment around them. Therefore, understanding how their perceptions of impact on firm competitiveness vary with 17 characteristics of the bribery case is likely to provide with useful evidence on how managers think of the costs of bribery. Moreover, an advantage of the perceptual data is that the dependent variable captures the impact on firm competitiveness from the detection of bribery. Research that will use actual data will need to isolate the effect of bribery detection and control for any other confounding factors that might affect a firm's competitiveness.
There are numerous avenues for future research that explores the costs of bribery after detection.
First, it would be useful to better understand which business relations are more likely to be affected by bribery cases. The effect could vary between customers and suppliers, and between large multinational corporations and local companies. Second, if executives believe that dismissing the initiator of the bribery is likely to mitigate any impact on firm competitiveness then why in some cases the initiator is not dismissed? Third, how does the impact on firm competitiveness evolve as social, technological and political institutions change? Citizens are becoming less tolerant of corruption and the rise of the internet and social media allow for corruption cases to become more broadly known. Moreover, enforcement against bribery from regulatory authorities has been increasing from non-existent to considerable.
Understanding how those larger trends will influence the effect of bribery detection on firm competitiveness is likely to increase our understanding of the phenomenon.
Appendix Variables Description
Reputation A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's reputation from bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if it is "Significant"
Business Relations
A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's business relations from bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if it is "Significant"
Regulatory Relations
A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's regulatory relations from bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if it is "Significant" Employees A variable that takes the value of one if the impact on a firm's employee morale from bribery is "Not significant", two if it is "Neither Significant or Insignificant" or three if it is "Significant"
Financial Impact
A variable that takes the value of one if the direct financial impact from bribery is "Less than $100,000", two if it is "Between $100,000 and $500,000" or three if it is "More than $500,000" 
